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courage is contagious

Viewing cable 09MANAMA236, SCENESETTER FOR SPECIAL ENVOY MITCHELL

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the [structure of a cable](#) as well as how to [discuss them](#) with others. See also the [FAQs](#)

Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags **#cablegate** and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. **#09MANAMA236**.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
09MANAMA236	2009-04-17 16:10	2011-08-30 01:44	SECRET	Embassy Manama

Appears in these articles:

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PP RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR
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ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 171610Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8628
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 1403
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 0140
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 0717
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1029
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 1239
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 3624
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 2677

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAMA 000236

SIPDIS

FOR S/E MITCHELL'S PARTY FROM CDA CHRISTOPHER HENZEL
BAGHDAD FOR AMBASSADOR ERELI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2029
TAGS: [PREL](#) [KWBG](#) [KPAL](#) [TU](#) [IS](#) [BA](#)
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SPECIAL ENVOY MITCHELL

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Christopher Henzel, for reasons 1
.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (SBU) Bahrain is eager to see the Obama administration's peacemaking efforts succeed, and your visit April 20 will be big news here. King Hamad will receive you at his palace in Safariyah, joined by Foreign Minister Shaikh Khalid bin Ahmad bin Mohammad, and others. Ambassador Ereli, who is nearing the end of his TDY in Iraq, will be in Bahrain for your visit.

Moderates vs. Extremists

¶2. (S) King Hamad presides over a genteel tug-of-war between modernizers and reactionaries in his own Al-Khalifa clan. The modernizing elements (led by his son, Crown Prince Salman, and Foreign Minister Shaikh Khalid) are actively seeking a means by which to outflank and marginalize extremists, both within Bahrain and in the Arab world. The Crown Prince has told us explicitly that as long as the Israeli/Palestinian conflict festers, it will provide fuel to the conservative Sunni elements within Bahrain that oppose the openness and reform that he sees as indispensable for the country's growth and prosperity. It also empowers Hamas, Hizballah and Iran, whom the Bahraini leadership consider a threat to the region and their regime. Crown Prince Salman and Shaikh Khalid have urged the USG to make it clear to those supporting extremism that they will pay a price in terms of their relationship with the U.S. They are referring principally to Qatar, whose foreign policy) particularly its support for Hamas - is viewed in Manama as dangerous. The Crown Prince and Shaikh Khalid view other Arab moderates like the UAE and Jordan as natural allies, and often collaborate with them.

The &Other8 Shaikh Khalid

¶3. (S) On the other side of the tug-of-war, occasionally (and temporarily) pulling Bahrain's foreign policy in unhelpful directions, are Al-Khalifas close to the Sunni religious parties who are the majority in Bahrain's elected lower house of parliament. For instance, they successfully advocated for Khalid Mishaal's official visits to Bahrain in September, 2008 and March, 2009. They also oppose compromise with Bahrain's Shia majority, and are sullen over the mass pardon the King granted this week to 178 Shia security

detainees. The Minister of the Royal Court, Shaikh Khalid bin Ahmad bin Salman (not to be confused with FM Shaikh Khalid bin Ahmad bin Mohammad) is one of these hard-liners, and may join your meeting with the King. If this &other8 Shaikh Khalid is present, you may find FM Shaikh Khalid more circumspect than he was in Washington.

FM,s Plan to Engage with Israeli Media

¶4. (S) FM Shaikh Khalid appreciated his meeting with you in Washington, and told me April 16 that he would try to find some steps that could be taken within the spirit of the Arab Peace Initiative in order to support you and the new administration. He added that he would like to engage with the Israeli media, and that it would help him if you could tell the King that GOB contact with Israeli media would be helpful. In response to my observation that Bahrain had gone much further than this over the past two years, engaging directly with the Israeli government publicly and privately, the FM said he could no longer defend internally his past &close8 contacts with Israel, in light of FM Lieberman,s statement about Annapolis. Shaikh Khalid hopes the U.S. and moderate Arabs will be able to persuade the Netanyahu government to walk back from this position, and attend a Moscow &Annapolis II8 meeting.

Regional Proposal: Shelved for Now

¶5. (S) Last September, FM Shaikh Khalid proposed a new regional organization that would have included Iran and Israel. (The proposal was reportedly the result of an early-2008 brainstorming session between King Hamad and

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President Gul of Turkey.) The proposal never came to much, but it was an indicator of Bahrain's desire to be seen as a creative contributor to Arab-Israeli diplomacy. The FM told me April 16 that during Gul,s visit to Bahrain April 15, Gul and King Hamad had agreed that the proposal for a new organization proposal should be shelved until after &we re-start a dialogue8 with Israel.

Visit Embassy Manama's Classified Website:

<http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/manama/>

HENZEL